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This paper assesses the costs and effectiveness of several energy policies for light-duty motor 
vehicles in the United States, using a version of the National Energy Modeling System. The 
policies addressed are higher fuel taxes, tighter vehicle efficiency standards, and financial 
subsidies and penalties for the purchase of high- and low-efficiency vehicles (feebates). I find 
that tightening fuel-efficiency standards beyond those currently mandated through 2016, or 
imposing feebates designed to accomplish similar changes, can achieve by 2030 reductions in 
energy use by all light-duty passenger vehicles of 7.1 to 8.4 percent. A stronger feebate policy 
has somewhat greater effects, but at a significantly higher unit cost. High fuel taxes, on the order 
of $2.00 per gallon (2007$), have somewhat greater effects, arguably more favorable cost-
effectiveness ratios, and produce their effects much more quickly because they affect the usage 
rate of both new and used vehicles. Policy costs vary greatly with assumptions about the reason 
for the apparent myopia commonly observed in consumer demand for fuel efficiency, and with 
the inclusion or exclusion of ancillary costs of congestion, local air pollution, and accidents. 
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  The significant role of motor vehicles used for passenger travel in greenhouse gas 
emissions and petroleum consumption is well known. Consequently, most analysts believe that 
serious strategies to address climate change or energy dependence will require significant 
reductions from this sector. 
  This paper undertakes an assessment of effectiveness and costs of various policies aimed 
at such reductions in the United States. It does so by defining specific measures as input 
parameters to a version of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS), a comprehensive 
model of energy sectors used by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) for its regular 
projections and analyses (EIA 2009b). The paper is part of a larger suite of studies at Resources 
for the Future using its own particular adaptation of NEMS, known as NEMS-RFF, and other 
tools to analyze a wide variety of energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) policies in a consistent 
manner facilitating comparison (Krupnick et al. 2010). 
  The specific policies addressed here are aimed directly at fuel consumption by light duty 
vehicles: higher fuel taxes, tighter vehicle efficiency standards, and financial subsidies and 
penalties for the purchase of high- and low-efficiency vehicles (feebates). These are among the 
most prominently discussed policies, but of course are only a subset of those that can be 
considered; for example, I do not examine transit subsidies or policies aimed at changing urban 
land use patterns, mainly because other studies suggest they are either too weak or too long-term 
to compete with these more direct policies in terms of medium-term cost-effectiveness. Two 
other direct policies are the subjects of other studies in the larger effort just described: subsidies 
to hybrid vehicles, which are found to be mostly redundant if a policy aimed at fuel efficiency is 
in place, and natural gas trucks, which appear potentially promising. Yet another policy worth 
considering, but not examined here, is natural gas for light-duty vehicles; this policy has lost 
favor due to the significant loss of storage space to fuel canisters, but it probably merits a 
reexamination now that newly cheap natural gas, including much produced within the U.S., has 
emerged on the world market. 
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  For each policy modeled, the effects are determined with respect to a baseline scenario. 
The baseline is a variant of the NEMS simulation (to 2030) contained in the updated Annual 
Energy Outlook 2009 scenario of EIA (2009a), which includes the 2009 federal stimulus 
package; that simulation is further modified here to incorporate the National Fuel Efficiency 
Policy as announced by the President in May 2009. In the latter program, GHG standards have 
been developed for passenger vehicles and integrated with fuel-efficiency standards. 
  Estimating the social costs of such policies is more difficult than it might appear. A 
model that is fully derived from a single formulation of well-defined utility and profit functions, 
such as that by Bento et al. (2009), would contains all of the information needed for rigorous 
welfare analysis; but it would have the disadvantage of a limited range of mathematically 
tractable demand functions and market interactions. In contrast, a model such as NEMS-RFF, 
containing many empirically based components, can be more realistic but does not permit a 
direct calculation of consumer utility; instead, the components of social cost must be inferred 
from the empirical demand and cost relationships. Doing so is complex because of the many 
interacting dimensions of behavior involved. Furthermore, certain well-established behavioral 
regularities represented in NEMS-RFF, such as consumers’ use of short time horizons for their 
purchase decisions, are at least superficially inconsistent with standard assumptions of economic 
theory, and therefore require auxiliary assumptions to determine changes in well-being. 
  The results show that even aggressive versions of these policies achieve only modest 
reductions in petroleum use and greenhouse gas emissions. Stronger policies are possible, but at 
diminishing effectiveness and increasing costs. Policy costs are found to depend greatly on two 
factors that are empirically uncertain. First, if consumers’ hesitancy to fully value fuel savings is 
because those savings are tied to amenity losses that are hidden to analysts, then the policy costs 
are much higher, especially for policies aiming directly at fuel efficiency. Second, including 
external costs raises the costs of fuel-efficiency policies, but lowers the costs of a fuel tax, 
making the latter negative. Finally, a fuel tax achieves its targeted policy gains much more 
quickly than fuel-efficiency policies because it relies more heavily on reductions in vehicle use, 
which apply to used as well as new vehicles. 
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1.  Passenger Highway Transportation in the United States 
 
  The relative contribution of transportation to energy problems is quite different 
depending on which problem one considers. According to, light-duty vehicles (LDVs) —
consisting of passenger cars, vans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks—accounted for 44 
percent of liquid fuels consumption but only 15 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions in 
2008.
1 Energy consumption by LDVs grew by 70 percent from 1970 to 2007, although the pat
was punctuated by occasional declines (Figure 1). The overall growth was a net result of t
countering trends, also shown in the figure. Vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) rose dramatically, by 
168 percent, while the fuel intensity of vehicles (i.e., the reciprocal of fuel efficiency), declined 
by 36 percent. Thus, vehicles became more efficient, but not enough so to overcome the huge 































Figure 1. Changes in Fuel Use and Its Components 
Note: VMT, vehicle-miles traveled. 
Source: Computed from data in Davis et al. (2009). 
 
  Looking more deeply into the decline in fuel intensity, it appears that it was caused 
mainly by improvements in the fuel efficiencies of individual vehicles, somewhat counteracted 
in more recent years by adverse changes in the size mix of vehicles. For example, between 1980 
                                                 
1 Computed from EIA (2009d), Table 19, combined with the proportion of U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions consisting 
of energy-related carbon dioxide, which is 5810 / 7049 = 82.4%, from EIA (2010), Table 12.1. 
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and 2008, the fuel economies of small cars and midsize sports utility vehicles (SUVs) rose by 21 
percent and 76 percent, respectively. But the market shares of small cars and midsize SUVs went 
in opposite directions over that period, that of small cars declining (by 23 percentage points) and 
that of midsize SUVs rising (by 16 percentage points), thereby eroding some of the energy 
savings from the technology changes. The relevance of this example is confirmed by 
disaggregating all LDVs into 15 size classes, six of cars and nine of light trucks.
2 Had market 
shares of these size classes remained at 1980 values, the sales-weighted average fuel efficiency 
of new LDVs in 2008 would have been 27.3 mpg rather than 24.0 mpg as it actually was.
3 
  Fuel prices have played a significant role in driving vehicle fuel efficiency, and they 
promise to continue to do so in the future. Real gasoline prices in the U.S. declined sharply from 
1982 through 1988, and remained low for a decade. A gradual rise began in 1999, accelerating 
sharply in 2003; but only in 2008 did it again reach its 1980-1982 value. The average fuel 
efficiency of new LDVs has moved inversely to these trends, as theory would predict. Studies 
that attempt to disentangle the effect of fuel price from other causes have generally found a 
consistent, though moderate, response of fleetwide fuel efficiency to price. This response is 
measured by Small and Van Dender (2007a, Table 5) as a long-run elasticity of fuel efficiency 
with respect to fuel price of 0.20, based on a cross-sectional time series of U.S. states from years 
1966-2001.
4 
  Data on market shares of new-vehicle sales further illuminate the effect of the sharp run-
up in prices in 2003–2008. Table 1 shows market shares for various LDVs in 2004 and 2008, 
grouped this time into six categories. During this time, the market share of cars rise by 4.0 
percentage points. The biggest shifts were from pickup trucks toward large and midsize cars, 
resulting in a modest increase in average fuel efficiency. Austin (2008), making a similar point 
                                                 
2 In this paper, LDVs consist of cars and light trucks, the latter including vans, SUVs, and pickup trucks with gross 
weight less than 8,500 pounds. Vans, SUVs, and pickup trucks with gross weight 8,500–10,000 pounds—including 
the Hummer—are treated differently in NEMS-RFF and called “commercial light trucks,” although elsewhere they 
are called “intermediate trucks” or “Class 2b vehicles”. 
3 Calculated from data in Davis et al. (2009), Tables 4.7, 4.9. 
4 Small and Van Dender also measure a short-run (one-year) elasticity of 0.04. Li, Timmins, and von Haefen (2009) 
obtain similar results (short- and long-run elasticities 0.02 and 0.20) using micro data in 20 US metropolitan areas 
for years 1997-2005; they find this arises almost all from new-car sales and very little from vehicle scrappage. More 
recent papers demonstrating similar responses include Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2009) and Gillingham 
(2010). 
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for the 2004–2006 period, also models the response statistically using monthly data by vehicle 
category; he finds that a 20 percent increase in gasoline price raises the market share of cars 
among new LDVs by 2.6 percentage points. 
 
Table 1. Market-Share Shifts among Selected Sizes and 
Types of LDVs, 2004–2008 
Vehicles 2004  2008  Change 
Cars      
  Small  22.8%  22.7%  0.0% 
  Medium  17.1%  18.8%  1.7% 
  Large  8.2%  10.5%  2.3% 
    Subtotal cars  48.0%  52.0%  4.0% 
Light Trucks       
  Pickups  16.0%  12.9%  –3.1% 
  Vans  6.1%  5.4%  –0.6% 
  SUVs  30.0%  29.6%  –0.4% 
    Subtotal trucks  52.0%  48.0%  –4.0% 
Total 100.0%  100.0%  0.0% 
Source: Computed from data in Davis et al. (2009, Tables 4.7, 4.9). 
 
  The other major driver of fuel efficiency in U.S. passenger vehicles has been the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which went into effect in 1978. Applied 
separately to cars and light trucks, the standards rose gradually through 1984 and then were 
nearly flat for 20 years, at 27.5 mpg for cars and approximately 20.5 mpg for trucks. The 
standard for light trucks then began to rise again, starting in 2005.
5 
  Two subsequent changes in fuel-efficiency regulations will bring significant new 
increases in fuel efficiency starting in 2011. The first is due to the Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) of 2007, which mandates regulations intended to achieve average fuel 
efficiency of LDVs of 35 mpg in model year 2020 (Congressional Research Service 2007). The 
                                                 
5 Beginning in model year 2011, the standard for light trucks will be based on a footprint-based structure, meaning 
the average efficiency required of a given manufacturer’s vehicles is based on the sizes of those vehicles. 
Furthermore, vehicles with gross weights of 8,500–10,000 pounds, known as medium duty passenger vehicles, are 
finally brought into CAFE regulation starting in 2011 (NHTSA 2006). See GAO (2010, pp. 3-9) for a succinct but 
detailed history of fuel efficiency regulations in the United States. 
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second change is that embodied in the National Fuel Efficiency Policy announced by President 
Obama in May 2009. Under this program, GHG and fuel-efficiency regulations are coordinated, 
resulting in an expected new-vehicle fuel efficiency of about 35 mpg by model year 2016.
6 Thus, 
current legislation and regulatory decisions provide for sharp increases in fuel efficiency through 
2016 but little or no further tightening after that. 
 
2.  Light-Duty Vehicles in NEMS-RFF 
  
  LDVs are divided in NEMS-RFF into two types, cars and light trucks. Each of these is 
divided into six size classes, each intended to represent a relatively homogeneous product in 
terms of measurable characteristics valued by consumers.
7 LDVs also encompass 16 fuel types, 
the most important of which are conventional gasoline, conventional diesel, E85 (a blend of 85 
percent ethanol and 15 percent gasoline), and gasoline-electric hybrid. Finally, LDVs are 
produced by seven manufacturer groups, each treated by the model as a single manufacturer for 
determining CAFE compliance.
8 Three of these groups represent foreign producers, whose 
reactions are fully integrated into the model; while their associated spending will not be reflected 
in the general economic results depicted in the model, their costs are fully included in the welfare 
calculations undertaken here and described in Section 5. 
  Responses to energy markets occur in the model at several points. First, each 
manufacturer group chooses which technologies to adopt in a given year, taking into account 
consumers’ valuation of attributes including fuel savings as well as CAFE regulations (EIA 
2008, 10–45).
9 The available technologies improve exogenously over time and their costs exhibit 
                                                 
6 More precisely, the new-vehicle fuel efficiency in 2016 would be 35.5 if the mandated GHG reductions were 
attained solely through fuel-efficiency improvements. See U.S. EPA and U.S. DOT (2009); U.S. EPA and NHTSA 
(2010a). 
7 The classes for cars are mini-compact, subcompact, compact, midsize, large, and two-seaters (sports cars); those 
for light trucks are small and large pickups, small and large vans, and small and large SUVs. 
8 The groups are: domestic car manufacturers, imported car manufacturers, three domestic light truck manufacturers, 
and two imported light truck manufacturers (EIA 2008, 8, 11) 
9 Thus manufacturers are assumed to consider any applicable fines for CAFE violations, currently $50 per vehicle 
per unit mpg deficit, as part of production costs. I have increased the fine used in the model to $200, reflecting 
anticipated tougher enforcement. A more sophisticated approach is taken by Jacobsen (2010), who includes the 
CAFE standard as a constraint that can be violated at some fixed cost (representing political considerations) plus the 
cost of fines; he finds that the constraint is binding on the largest U.S. manufacturers, with shadow cost for 
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learning by doing (EIA 2008, 20); but no explicit process of research and development is 
modeled, and the technologies are basically those known today, giving the model a somewhat 
conservative bias in analyzing very strong policies. Manufacturers’ decisions about technologies 
produce a set of market shares for those technologies, which in turn determine the range of 
vehicle characteristics that are offered within each fuel type and size class. 
  Next, consumers as a group make several choices, modeled as aggregate demand 
functions (EIA 2008, 51–77).
10 First, they choose the shares of cars and light trucks according to 
a logit-like formula that predicts the change in market share from the previous year as a function 
of changes in variables including income, fuel price, and new-vehicle fuel efficiency.
11 Second, 
they choose among the six size classes available for each of the cars and light trucks according to 
an aggregate model, again predicting change in market share from the previous year as a function 
of changes in several variables such as fuel price, vehicle price, and income (EIA 2008, 10, 41). 
Third, consumers choose market shares of various fuel types through a three-level aggregate 
nested logit model whose variables describe vehicle price, fuel cost, range, acceleration, and 
other factors (EIA 2008, 51–61). EIA has calibrated the coefficients of these aggregate choice 
models to match known market shares in recent years, and has added some projected variation in 
them over time representing judgments about the likely evolution of tastes and marketing 
practices. 
  Finally, the stock of LDVs on the road is determined by combining new-vehicle sales, as 
described above, with exogenous vehicle survival rates (EIA 2008, 78–84). Total VMT are 
modeled as a consumer choice determined by a lagged adjustment process following a log-linear 
regression with two variables: income and fuel cost per mile (EIA 2008, 84–85). These VMT are 
apportioned exogenously by vintage, a key part of determining total energy consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                             
passenger cars varying from $52 per vehicle for Ford (approximately equal to the actual fine) to $438 for GM. This 
result accords with the conventional industry view that U.S. manufacturers comply with CAFE even though it would 
be cheaper for them to pay fines.  
10 An additional, simpler, model replaces consumer choices in the case of fleet vehicles, such as those of government 
agencies or rental companies (EIA 2008, 61–62). Fleets account for 10–20 percent of vehicle sales. 
11 This formula seems not well documented in the NEMS model descriptions, but was provided to me by 
OnLocation, Inc./Energy Systems Consulting, the private firm that adapted NEMS and ran it as NEMS-RFF for this 
study. 
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  Despite its advantages in comprehensiveness and realism, NEMS-RFF contains several 
limitations for our purposes. First, because the parameters affecting choice among vehicle types 
are constant, those choices cannot respond to long-term events that might be influenced 
indirectly by policy, such as marketing campaigns or changes in the perceived reliability of new 
technologies.
12 Second, manufacturers are assumed to set price of each vehicle type equal to its 
average production cost, including any fines, fees, or rebates; this assumption does not allow 
them to use price differentials to influence sales mix as part of a strategy to meet regulations.
13 
Third, there is no used-vehicle market, but rather scrappage of old cars is exogenous; this 
precludes some possibly important effects through postponement of scrappage (due to more 
expensive new vehicles) or differential scrappage of efficient and inefficient vehicles. 
 
Consumer Myopia 
  Researchers have long debated whether consumers fully account for future operating-cost 
savings in their purchases of durable goods, including automobiles (Greene 2010). The 
predominant view is that they do not; for example, Allcott and Wozny (2010), using a very large 
data set of individual transactions and controlling for many potentially confounding effects, find 
that market prices for new and used automobiles respond as though consumers account for at 
most 61 percent of those fuel costs. Explanations include credit constraints, imperfect 
information, information overload in decision making, and consumers’ uncertainty about future 
fuel prices and the duration of their vehicle holdings.
14 Whatever the reason, the phenomenon is 
often called consumer myopia, that is, apparent short-sightedness compared to a fully rational 
and informed consumer; sometimes it is called the energy paradox.  
  The empirical evidence is decidedly mixed, and a careful review concludes that there is 
                                                 
12 I account for changing perceptions in a very limited way by adjusting a constant in the model of vehicle-type 
choice that expresses a preference against gasoline-electric hybrid technology, other things equal. Specifically, in 
analyzing the CAFE and feebate policies described below, I assume (both in the baseline and policy scenario) that 
this constant diminishes gradually to zero, meaning that consumers fully accept hybrid technology. 
13 The literature contains considerable variation in its findings about how important changes in sales mix are in 
response to policies aimed at fuel efficiency. Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2011), using a very thorough 
engineering model to simulate manufacturers’ design responses, find that redesign, as opposed to sales mix, 
accounts for nearly two-thirds of the response to a tighter CAFE standard over even a short time horizon 2011-2014.  
14 This phenomenon probably is not caused by overly optimistic consumer price expectations, because direct 
measurement shows that on average consumers believe the current price will continue (Anderson et al. 2011).  
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no clear explanation for the diversity of research results (Greene 2010). Yet NEMS-RFF assumes 
considerable such myopia in its default parameters, used here: a payback period of just three 
years, and discounting at a high interest rate of 15 percent (EIA 2009c, 59). Thus it is possible 
that the NEMS-RFF assumptions are biased toward finding a smaller response to incentives or 
regulations than would actually occur. 
  Even if consumer “myopia” is correctly measured, its source is unknown. But as I show 
in Section 5, differences in the assumed source strongly affect the interpretation of demand in 
terms of social costs. To cover a wide range of possibilities, I compute the costs of energy 
policies there under two different extreme assumptions: namely that the apparent myopia in 
NEMS-RFF is caused entirely by deficiencies in markets—the “market failure” interpretation—
or that it is caused entirely by unobserved amenity losses that occur as part of fuel efficiency 
improvements—the “hidden amenity” interpretation. For the final policy comparison, I adopt an 
assumption exactly half-way between these extremes. 
 
3. Policy  Options 
 
3.1 Fuel  Tax 
 
  The most direct policy to reduce fuel consumption is taxing fuel. This policy does not 
appear to have political support at this time, but is still a useful benchmark and also gives some 
idea of the types of results that could be expected from more broad-based policies that raise the 
price of carbon emissions. It has the advantage of promoting fuel conservation in many 
directions, not just one. In particular, it promotes reduced driving and changes in driving 
behavior, including speed, in all vehicles and not just new ones. Administrative mechanisms 
already exist. Furthermore, a single policy can easily target not only LDVs but also heavy trucks. 
  In NEMS-RFF, fuel tax revenues simply go into the national budget and do not affect any 
other tax rates. For this reason, NEMS-RFF does not incorporate any exacerbation of deadweight 
losses from labor taxation, such as is discussed by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder et 
al. (1997), and Goulder and Williams (2003). I therefore refrain from discussing alternate uses of 
tax revenues, even though they could make a considerable difference to the net social costs of 
alternate policies. I return to the subject of deadweight loss in Section 5. 
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3.2  Fuel Efficiency Standards 
 
  Fuel efficiency standards (herein also called CAFE standards) aim at one component of 
energy use by passenger transportation, namely, the efficiency of the vehicles used. In the 
version currently being implemented by NHTSA, the goal is narrower still: it aims to foster 
technology improvements to vehicles, and it does so by mandating a standard that varies by the 
vehicle footprint—roughly the area of roadway covered by the four points of contact of its tires. 
NHTSA has provided an elaborately researched rationale for this approach, which is scheduled 
to begin in model year 2011. The rationale is basically one of safety: NHTSA interprets two 
decades of research as showing that larger vehicles are safer than smaller ones, at least in the 
lower portion of the range of vehicle sizes. 
  The safety issue is complex because a vehicle of larger size and weight is safer for its 
occupants but more dangerous for anyone colliding with it. This is accounted for in the research 
reviewed by NHTSA, but some behavioral reactions that may occur are not accounted for. 
Specifically, if individuals choose large vehicles as a defensive measure, wishing to improve 
their relative size or weight as protection against damage from collisions, then the average size 
and weight chosen may well be higher than socially desirable. Indeed, several recent studies find 
considerable social safety benefits in shifting a driver from a large to a small passenger vehicle, 
especially from a light truck to a car.
15 
  Thus there is evidence that widespread reductions in vehicle size and weight would be 
beneficial rather than harmful to safety, despite the remaining research uncertainties well 
described by Greene (2009). Even if the overall effect is neutral, the safety externality is 
unambiguously in a direction that would favor policies to explicitly encourage downsizing of 
vehicles, especially the substitution of cars for pickup trucks. 
                                                 
15White (2004), Brozovíc and Ando (2009), and Li (2010). The point is intuitively depicted by Wenzel and Ross 
(2005), who calculate the fatality experience of 92 popular models of LDVs covering model years 1997–2001, using 
data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System. The results show that the risk to other drivers—i.e. the 
externality—varies strongly by vehicle type, generally rising with vehicle size. Furthermore, there is great variation 
in safety records among specific models of the same vehicle class, much of which can be traced to specific 
technological differences; this suggests that safety technology and driver behavior are the main determinants of 
vehicle safety, with size and weight only secondary. 
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  Because of the limitations on consumer behavior noted in Section 2, NEMS-RFF is not 
the ideal model for investigating this type of complex behavior. For this reason, the scenarios 
specified here accept NHTSA’s footprint-based approach, and do not allow manufacturers to 
intentionally alter their vehicle mix through pricing. As a result, the standards modeled here may 
appear less effective and more costly than would be possible to achieve in practice. Probably the 
discrepancy is not very large because shifts in vehicle mix seem to play only a small role in 
several other simulation analyses of the CAFE and feebate policies that do allow for them (Kleit 
2004; Greene et al. 2005a,b). 
  CAFE standards have considerable political appeal, compared to a fuel tax, because they 
avoid any explicit tax on a consumer good—although of course they do raise the price of 
vehicles. They also have some disadvantages. First, they provide no incentive to adopt other 
ways of reducing fuel consumption, such as reducing speed, driving less aggressively, or 
reducing VMT. Second, they actually provide an incentive to increase VMT because, by 
reducing the fuel cost of traveling a given distance, they lower the effective price of driving. 
  This last-noted disadvantage is known as the rebound effect. Most research has found a 
long-run rebound effect of 10 to 30 percent: that is, the long-run elasticity of VMT with respect 
to the fuel cost of driving is between –0.1 and –0.3. One recent study, however, suggests that the 
rebound effect falls with real income and that, in the United States, it has now fallen 
considerably below the values just described (Small and Van Dender 2007a). In its rulemaking 
on CAFE standards, NHTSA (2008, 24409) highlights this study as crucial to its decisions about 
modeling the rebound effect but compromises on a long-term value of 15 percent (elasticity –
0.15). NEMS-RFF produces a value of around 17 percent; if this value overstates the rebound 
effect, NEMS-RFF will be unduly pessimistic about the effectiveness of a CAFE standard and 
unduly optimistic about that of a fuel tax.
16 
  Two other features of CAFE standards, as modeled here, should be mentioned. First, for 
simplicity, the standard is applied to all fuels equally, after adjusting for energy density. Second, 
I do not explicitly incorporate trading of credits across manufacturers—that is, allowing one 
                                                 
16 Gillingham (2010) finds an average short- to medium-run elasticity of -0.15, and a cross-sectional pattern in 
which the elasticity is rising in magnitude with income except at the lowest incomes. This empirical result, based on 
micro data in California over the period 2001-09, is identified almost entirely on the time-series variation and thus 
mainly on the sharp price rise and collapse during 2006-09. While the author controls for economic conditions, they 
were so unusual during much of this period, especially during the price collapse, that further corroboration is 
needed. 
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company that exceeds its CAFE standard to sell credits to another that falls short. EISA provides 
for some such trading and, theoretically, it has efficiency advantages; but they may be minor in 
practice because the footprint-based standards already incorporate differences among 
manufacturers. Furthermore, NEMS-RFF models the manufacturer as a broad category rather 





  It is possible to combine some of the features of fuel efficiency regulations with those of 
tax incentives through a feebate policy—a combination of fees and rebates related to fuel 
efficiency. Specifically, the policy imposes on the manufacturer a fee for each vehicle that falls 
short of some specified level of fuel efficiency (the pivot point), and a rebate on each vehicle that 
exceeds the level.
17 This policy has the advantage that it provides incentives to improve every 
vehicle, as opposed to a CAFE standard which may or may not be binding for a given 
manufacturer.  
  The pivot point can be set so that the program is approximately revenue-neutral. It can 
also be set differently for different classes of vehicles, just as CAFE standards are: Johnson 
(2006) stresses the political and administrative advantage of this approach because it produces 
much smaller magnitudes of fines and rebates. Although doing so foregoes the advantage of 
inducing vehicle-mix shifts, policy simulations by Greene et al. (2005a,b) suggest that such shifts 
would not be too important, accounting for only about 4 percent of the change in average fuel 
efficiency caused by feebates with a single pivot point.
18 I found also through experimentation 
that NEMS-RFF produces only small shifts in vehicle mix when a single pivot point is used. 
                                                 
17 This can be viewed as a major extension of the “gas guzzler tax” currently in place, which incorporates the fee but 
not the rebate, and which currently applies only to cars, not trucks. In practice the gas guzzler tax affects only high-
performance specialty cars and is not modeled in NEMS-RFF. A nonlinear feebate policy was introduced in the U.S. 
Senate by the chair of its Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in 2009, as the Efficient Vehicle Leadership 
Act. Sometimes the rebate is given directly to the consumer instead of the manufacturer; this makes no difference 
within the NEMS-RFF model, although there is suggestive evidence that actually consumers bear more of a tax or 
capture more of a rebate than they do if it is directed to the manufacturer (Sallee 2010). 
18 In contrast, Bunch et al. (2011, p. 23) find that sales mix accounts for 23% of the improvement in new-vehicle 
fuel economy over model years 2011-2018, even when the feebate is based on footprint and thus eliminates any 
incentive to downsize vehicles. 
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Therefore, the simulations shown here are with a separate pivot point for each of NEMS-RFF’s 
12 vehicle size classes.  
  Greene et al. (2005a,b) find substantial gains in fuel efficiency from a policy whose fee 
and rebate schedule is set to $1,000 per 0.01 gallon per mile (gpm) fuel intensity, a level that 
implies a difference of $108 between two otherwise similar vehicles getting 30 and 31 mpg fuel 
efficiency. By making the schedule proportional to fuel intensity (gpm) rather than efficiency 
(mpg), the policy provides a constant incentive rate for each gallon of fuel consumed, assuming 
that all vehicles are driven the same amount per year. 
 
4.  Policy Specification and Results 
 
  This section describes the specific forms of the three policy types that are simulated—an 
increased fuel tax, stricter fuel efficiency standards (CAFE), and a tax/rebate schedule for new 
vehicles—and presents simulation results.  
 
4.1 Fuel  Tax 
 
  The “High Fuel Tax” scenario increases the gasoline tax by an amount, in constant 2007 
dollars, that begins at $1.27 per gallon in 2010 and grows at an annual rate of 1.54 percent, 
reaching $1.73 per gallon in 2030.
19 The same tax increase (adjusted for energy density) is 
applied to diesel fuel, ethanol, and ethanol blends.  
  The results are shown in Table 2. The greatest impact is on vehicle travel, reducing VMT 
by 5 percent in 2020 and 6 percent in 2030—substantial but nowhere near enough to offset the 
increased VMT projected in the baseline scenario. The fuel tax also increases the fuel efficiency 
of new vehicles compared to the baseline, especially after 2016 when the CAFE requirements in 
the baseline stop rising. In 2030, the fuel efficiency of new LDVs would be 3.6 percent higher 
due to the fuel tax increase, part of which is caused by a small shift away from light trucks 
                                                 
19 This particular choice, made early in the course of the RFF project, was based loosely on a second-best fuel tax 
estimated by Parry and Small (2005), with the idea of providing an externality rationale for the tax increase. 
However it is not exactly a second-best tax, nor can it be derived explicitly as as a way to correct externalities. See 
Small (2010) for further discussion of its rationale. 
  13Energy Policies for Motor Vehicles  June 9, 2011  Kenneth Small   
toward cars.
20 Overall, however, these responses in fuel efficiency are small and result in less 
fuel savings that does the reduction in VMT. These results are broadly consistent with those of 
Morrow et al. (2010), also using a version of NEMS.
21 
 




2010 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gasoline price (2007$/gal) 2.14 5.00 5.43 1.40 1.65 39% 44%
  Tax component 0.38 1.84 2.04 1.49 1.73 432% 544%
Transportation outcomes
New LDVs:
  Cars - market share 49% 66% 68% 6% 4% 9.6% 6.8%
  Hybrids - market share 2% 17% 27% 2% 4% 15.6% 15.3%
  Diesels - market share 2% 7% 11% 1% 1% 20.3% 5.9%
  Fuel efficiency (mpg): 26.5 37.7 40.5 1.0 1.4 2.8% 3.6%
    Cars 30.4 41.3 43.8 0.2 0.8 0.5% 1.8%
    Trucks 23.6 32.2 35.0 0.7 1.2 2.2% 3.7%
All LDVs (new and used):
  Fuel efficiency (mpg) 20.6 25.5 30.6 0.4 0.9 1.5% 2.9%
  VMT (trillions) 2.79 2.99 3.64 -0.15 -0.24 -4.9% -6.1%
  Energy use (quad Btus) 16.4 14.5 14.8 -1.01 -1.40 -6.5% -8.6%
Economy-wide outcomes
  Energy-related CO2 (mmt) 5,746 5,751 6,058 -130 -135 -2.2% -2.2%
  Oil consumption (mbbl/day) 18.5 17.1 17.2 -0.8 -0.8 -4.3% -4.4%




  This policy reduces overall energy use by LDVs by 8.6 percent in 2030 relative to that in 
the baseline scenario. Total U.S. energy-related CO2 emissions, which include those from 
electricity generation, are reduced by just 2.2 percent in 2030. The fuel tax policy, unlike others 
considered in this paper, affects surface freight and air transportation, both of which use 
                                                 
20 In these results, efficiencies are stated as miles per gallon-equivalent, i.e. they are adjusted for energy density. The 
conversion factors are 1.133 gallon-equivalents per physical gallon of diesel, and 0.784 gallon-equivalents per 
physical gallon of E85. To put it differently, the tax is effectively placed on the energy content rather than the 
physical volume of motor-vehicle fuels. 
21 See Small (2010) for a more detailed comparison with Morrow et al (2010). In the simulations, the tax increase 
was also applied to diesel and jet fuel, so in principle would affect the heavy trucking and aviation sectors; however 
NEMS-RFF models those sectors as extremely price-inelastic and so the policy is best viewed as applying only to 
LDVs. 
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gasoline, diesel, or closely related fuels. However, it appears that NEMS-RFF treats these sectors 
as very unresponsive to energy prices, so effectively the economy-wide results reported here 
reflect changes in the LDV sector. 
  Some of the improved fuel efficiency in this scenario comes about through a higher 
market share of hybrids: 26.6 percent, compared to 23.4 percent for the baseline scenario, both in 
2030. This is largely because in NEMS-RFF, consumers respond to fuel prices in their choice of 
vehicle type. Detailed results show that with the fuel tax, CAFE is no longer binding as of 2016: 
that is, the average fuel efficiency exceeds the assumed legislative CAFE target of 34.9 mpg. 
  I also simulated a “Very High Fuel Tax” scenario (not shown in the tables): a tax increase 
of $3/gallon nominal in 2010, remaining constant in real terms. This scenario yields substantially 
greater effects: for example, it raises new-vehicle efficiency in 2030 by 3.1 mpg (rather than 
1.4), and reduces LDV energy use by 14.8 percent (rather than 8.6 percent). As we shall see in 
the next section, this success comes at a considerably higher marginal cost. 
  This last scenario, involving a tax increase that remains constant for 20 years, permits 
calculation of the model’s implied overall elasticities of VMT and fuel intensity with respect to 
fuel price: they are -0.16 and -0.10, respectively. By way of comparison, a literature review by 
Parry and Small (2005, 1283) finds central values for these elasticities to be -0.22 and -0.42, 
respectively.
22 Thus, the responsiveness of VMT in NEMS-RFF is slightly lower than that in the 
literature, while the responsiveness of fuel efficiency is much lower. This latter discrepancy is at 
least partly because here we are simulating a situation where strict CAFE standards are already 
included in the baseline scenario, so that higher fuel taxes do not further increase efficiency very 
much. 
 
                                                 
22 Parry and Small choose from that literature central values of -0.55 for the total price-elasticity and -0.55⋅0.4 = 
-0.22 for the elasticity of VMT. To calculate the implied elasticity of fuel intensity, we need to know that the total 
price-elasticity of fuel consumption is: εF = εVMT + εFI + εVMT⋅ε FI where εVMT and εFI are the elasticities of VMT and 
fuel intensity with respect to fuel price. This formula is derived by noting that f=m+i where f, m, and i are logarithms 
of fuel consumption, VMT, and fuel intensity, respectively; assuming that m depends on the logarithm of fuel cost 
pF+i; and taking the total derivative of f with respect to fuel price pF. See U.S. DOE (1996, p. 5-11), or note 26 of 
Small and Van Dender (2007b). Thus the Parry-Small choices imply that εVMT = (εF - εVMT)/(1+ εVMT) = 
-(0.55-0.22)/(1-0.22) = -0.42. The total price-elasticity of fuel consumption implied by the “Very High Fuel Tax” 
scenario estimated here is εF = -0.16 - 0.10 + (0.16⋅0.10) = -0.24. For a discussion of more recent literature 
estimating these elasticities, see Li, Timmins, and von Haefen (2009) and Small (2010). 
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4.2  Fuel Efficiency Standards 
 
  As already noted, the baseline scenario already has very ambitious fuel efficiency 
standards in place through 2016, achieving an average new-LDV fuel efficiency of 34.9 mpg in 
2016. But what about after 2016? The National Fuel Efficiency Policy was driven in part by the 
desire to extend California’s stringent policy targets to the federal level. It seems reasonable that 
another aggressive policy would do the same for another four years (the limit of California’s 
written targets). I therefore model a “Pavley CAFE” policy, named for the author of the 
California legislation, in which the federal standard follows the targets tentatively adopted by 
California for 2017–2020—namely, an increase of 3.7 percent per year—and continues to tighten 
after that at a rate of 2.5 percent per year.
23 Doing so implies a 48 percent increase in fuel 
efficiency standards between 2016 and 2030, to an average of 52 mpg. 
  Results are shown in Table 3. The Pavley CAFE is moderately effective, achieving by 
2030 an 18.8 percent increase in new-vehicle fuel efficiency and an 11.2 percent increase in the 
efficiency of the entire fleet, compared to the baseline scenario. Energy use from all LDVs is 
reduced by 8.4 percent relative to baseline, and total U.S. petroleum consumption is reduced by 
4.0 percent.
24 
  Several well-known defects of a CAFE policy can be seen in these results. First, the 
policy affects only new vehicles, so it takes several years to achieve its fuel savings: for example, 
the efficiency of the overall fleet rises (compared to baseline) by only 0.4 mpg in 2020. Second, 
as noted earlier, the policy does nothing to discourage driving and even encourages it somewhat. 
                                                 
23 In October 2010, EPA and NHTSA announced an intent to promulgate joint greenhouse-gas emissions standards 
and CAFE standards for new light-duty vehicles for model years 2017-2025 (U.S. EPA and NHTSA 2010b). For the 
technical analysis, they have considered annual emissions reductions of 3, 4, 5, and 6 percent. The Pavley CAFE 
scenario analyzed in this paper reduces the permitted fuel intensity by an average of 3.03 percent per year over the 
same nine-year period. EIA (2011) analyzes two “sensitivity cases” that incorporate 3 percent and 6 percent versions 
of this proposal, acknowledging that the latter would create serious compliance difficulties (EIA 2011, section on 
“Issues in Focus,” subsection on “Increasing Light-Duty Vehicle greenhouse Gas and Fuel Economy Standards for 
Model Years 2017 to 2025.”  
24 My results show bigger effects than do those of Morrow et al. (2010), as expected because they model a less 
aggressive policy. Jacobsen (2010), using an extension of the model of Bento et al. (2009), estimates what appears 
to be a greater response to CAFE tightening than shown here. The reason is that Jacobsen’s CAFE simulations 
produce substantially reduced driving (in contrast to the usual rebound effect), apparently because his model 
assumes that people do not like the new mix of vehicles as well as the original one, and so drive them less.  
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Third, the policy does not encourage a shift to smaller vehicles and, in fact, results in a slight 
shift away from cars toward light trucks.  
Table 3. Results: Pavley CAFE 
Value in
baseline
2010 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gasoline price (2007$/gal) 2.14 3.62 3.69 0.02 -0.10 0% -3%
  Tax component 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.00 0.00 0% 0%
Transportation outcomes
New LDVs:
  Cars - market share 49% 59% 59% -1% -3% -1.8% -5.6%
  Hybrids - market share 2% 25% 28% 1% 2% 3.1% 6.0%
  Diesels - market share 2% 5% 9% 0% -1% -4.0% -7.1%
  Fuel efficiency (mpg): 26.5 40.2 46.2 3.0 7.3 8.1% 18.8%
    Cars 30.4 45.1 50.9 3.6 8.1 8.8% 18.9%
    Trucks 23.6 34.7 40.7 2.6 7.0 8.0% 20.9%
All LDVs (new and used):
  Fuel efficiency (mpg) 20.6 25.6 33.1 0.4 3.3 1.5% 11.2%
  VMT (trillions) 2.79 3.15 3.95 0.00 0.07 0.1% 1.9%
  Energy use (quad Btus) 16.4 15.3 14.9 -0.21 -1.36 -1.4% -8.4%
Economy-wide outcomes
  Energy-related CO2 (mmt) 5,747 5,869 6,088 -19 -101 -0.3% -1.6%
  Oil consumption (mbbl/day) 18.5 17.7 17.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7% -4.0%
Percentage




  It is worth noting that the policy as modeled does not actually achieve the legally set 
CAFE targets in the later years. This is because manufacturers are unable to find enough 
technologies at the rapid pace required, at least not at reasonable cost compared to the fines for 
non-compliance (assumed here to be $200 per unit improvement in mpg). Even under the 
baseline policy, manufacturers must pay a fine on 36 percent of vehicles sold in 2015 because 
they do not meet CAFE; under Pavley CAFE, the percentage of vehicles on which fines must be 
paid (i.e. the sales-weighted percentage of manufacturers who pay fines) continues to rise, to 69 
percent in 2020 and 100 percent in 2030—despite the fact that the market share of hybrids rises 
sharply over time.
25 This may reflect NEMS-RFF’s limitations in modeling technological 
                                                 
25 Comparing with Table 2, it might appear that CAFE favors hybrids more than does the High Fuel Tax, but 
actually the policy impact is less: 1.6 rather than 3.6 percentage points (these numbers are rounded to 2 and 4 in the 
tables). Because the CAFE and feebate scenarios use a more optimistic demand constant for hybrids than do the fuel 
tax scenarios  (in both the baseline and the policy simulations), as explained in Section 2, the hybrid shares in their 
baselines are somewhat higher: 26.6 percent in 2030, rather than 23.4 percent for the fuel tax. (These numbers, 
except for rounding, are the differences between the entries for “change due to policy” and “value with policy” in 
Tables 2 and 3.)  
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innovation. I also examined the Pavley CAFE policy under the EIA’s more optimistic “high-
tech” assumptions, resulting in 2030 fuel efficiency being by 9.1 mpg above baseline (instead of 
the 7.3 mpg shown in Table 3). 
  Another aspect of actual implementation of CAFE-like policies is that they invariably 
introduce discontinuities or “notches” into manufacturers’ and consumers’ constraints, leading to 
gaming behavior such as modifying vehicle design in order to reclassify them as light trucks 
(Sallee and Slemrod 2010). Even worse, some modeling evidence suggests that those firms 
choosing to pay fines (instead of meeting the standard) fill the market niche for high-
performance cars that is partially abandoned by firms meeting the standards, thereby severely 
eroding the fuel savings (Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos 2011). These features are not explicitly 
modeled here. 
     
4.3  Combined Fuel Tax and Fuel Efficiency Standards 
 
  We have seen that the fuel tax and CAFE policies achieve reductions in fuel use in 
different ways. The fuel tax primarily affects travel, with some favorable effect on fuel 
efficiency. CAFE policies primarily affect fuel efficiency, with a small but troublesome effect on 
travel in the wrong direction. This suggests that the policies do not really substitute for each 
other. What if we implement them together? 
  Table 4 shows the result, using the more aggressive fuel tax mentioned at the end of 
Section 4.1. Although the effects are somewhat less than additive, the combined policy does 
indeed achieve much of the advantages of each component. For example, consider the policy 
impact in 2030. The Very High Fuel Tax and the Pavley CAFE policy, each taken alone, 
increase the fuel efficiency of the average new LDV by 7.8 and 18.8 percent, respectively; 
together they improve it by 24.3 percent. This is somewhat less than their sum because, for some 
kinds of vehicles, the CAFE standard become nonbinding with the Very High Fuel Tax. The 
VMT changes are essentially additive. The net result of this combined policy (in 2030) is a 
reduction of 20.7 percent in energy use by LDVs. 
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Table 4. Results: Combined Pavley CAFE and Very High Fuel Tax 
Value in
baseline
2010 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gasoline price (2007$/gal) 2.14 6.38 6.84 2.78 3.05 77% 81%
  Tax component 0.38 3.42 3.49 3.07 3.17 889% 999%
Transportation outcomes
New LDVs:
  Cars - market share 49% 69% 70% 9% 7% 14.8% 11.4%
  Hybrids - market share 2% 30% 33% 6% 6% 23.2% 24.0%
  Diesels - market share 2% 7% 10% 1% 1% 27.6% 8.6%
  Fuel efficiency (mpg): 26.5 41.8 48.3 4.6 9.4 12.4% 24.3%
    Cars 30.4 45.8 51.8 4.3 9.0 10.5% 21.0%
    Trucks 23.6 34.8 41.8 2.7 8.1 8.4% 24.2%
All LDVs (new and used):
  Fuel efficiency (mpg) 20.6 26.3 34.4 1.0 4.6 4.1% 15.4%
  VMT (trillions) 2.79 2.88 3.54 -0.27 -0.33 -8.5% -8.6%
  Energy use (quad Btus) 16.4 13.6 12.9 -1.91 -3.36 -12.3% -20.7%
Economy-wide outcomes
  Energy-related CO2 (mmt) 5,747 5,626 5,897 -263 -292 -4.5% -4.7%
  Oil consumption (mbbl/day) 18.5 16.4 16.3 -1.5 -1.7 -8.2% -9.6%
policy






  The feebate policy can be viewed as an economic incentive targeted at the same goal as 
CAFE regulation: new-vehicle fuel efficiency. I have modeled a “High Feebate” policy aimed at 
achieving results roughly comparable to those of the Pavley CAFE policy. It has a basic rate of 
$2,000 per 0.01 gpm in 2007 dollars,
26 which is phased in starting at a half this rate in 2017 and 
rising in equal increments through 2021. The rate is then further increased at 2.5 percent per year 
(still in real terms), so that in 2030 it is $2,969 per 0.01 gpm. The pivot points are chosen to 
approximate a revenue-neutral policy within each vehicle size class.
27  
                                                 
26 This basic rate of $2,000/(0.01 gpm) is nearly twice that considered by Greene et al. (2005a,b), and slightly larger 
than that of Bunch et al. (2011). For a car driven 12,683 miles per year (our baseline 2021–2030 average) over a 14-
year life, the rate implies a payment of ($2,000/0.01gpm)/(12,683*14 miles) = $1.13 per gallon of fuel consumed. 
27 Specifically, for each class, the pivot point in a given year (i.e., the stated level of fuel intensity in gpm for which 
there is neither a fee nor a rebate) is set to the average achieved fuel intensity of the previous year, less 1.5 percent to 
reflect typical progress with this policy in place. 
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  Results are shown in Table 5. The feebate performs similarly to the Pavley CAFE, but it 
achieves more of its efficiency gains through the use of hybrids and diesels. This feature may be 
an artifact of NEMS-RFF’ modeling of hybrids as a consumer choice rather than a 
manufacturer’s strategy for meeting CAFE standards. Also, the feebate causes an even larger 
shift from cars to trucks—about twice the impact of Pavley CAFE—for reasons that are unclear. 
 
Table 5. Results: High Feebate 
Value in
baseline
2010 2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030
Gasoline price (2007$/gal) 2.14 3.59 3.67 -0.01 -0.12 0% -3%
  Tax component 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.00 0.00 0% 0%
Transportation outcomes
New LDVs:
  Cars - market share 49% 59% 57% -2% -6% -3.0% -9.0%
  Hybrids - market share 2% 31% 36% 7% 9% 29.1% 35.4%
  Diesels - market share 2% 8% 16% 3% 6% 56.1% 66.3%
  Fuel efficiency (mpg): 26.5 40.5 45.4 3.3 6.6 8.9% 16.9%
    Cars 30.4 43.9 49.6 2.5 6.8 6.0% 15.9%
    Trucks 23.6 36.4 40.8 4.3 7.2 13.4% 21.3%
All LDVs (new and used):
  Fuel efficiency (mpg) 20.6 25.8 33.0 0.5 3.2 2.1% 10.9%
  VMT (trillions) 2.79 3.16 3.95 0.02 0.08 0.5% 2.2%
  Energy use (quad Btus) 16.4 15.3 15.1 -0.20 -1.16 -1.3% -7.1%
Economy-wide outcomes
  Energy-related CO2 (mmt) 5,747 5,869 6,108 -20 -82 -0.3% -1.3%
  Oil consumption (mbbl/day) 18.5 17.7 17.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7% -3.7%
policy Absolute Percentage
Values with Change due to policy
 
 
  A “Very High Feebate” policy (not shown in the table), which sets the feebate rates to be 
exactly twice as large, was also simulated. It is correspondingly more effective on all measures: 
average fuel efficiency for new vehicles in 2030 rises to 48.3 mpg, while LDV energy use in 
2030 is reduced by 10 percent. These changes are far less than double those achieved by the 
High Feebate policy, demonstrating the diminishing ability of these policies to stimulate 
efficiency improvements. 
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5.  Costs of Policies 
 
5.1 Cost  Methodology 
 
  The social costs of policies are here measured by applying the usual microeconomic tools 
to the two primary markets affected, that for new vehicles and that for travel (which incorporates 
the market for fuel, as a derived demand). The full theory of welfare calculations in these 
interrelated markets is described in Small (2010, Appendix A); here I present an abbreviated and 
more intuitive version. 
  Annual costs and cost offsets (such as fuel savings), as well as policy effects (such as oil 
consumption), are taken from the NEMS-RFF output at five-year intervals over the policy period 
(2010–2030). Through interpolation and extrapolation, these are converted to annual values for 
each year, including approximate values covering the remaining lifetimes of vehicles purchased 
during the policy period. These annual values are then cumulated, with discounting at a five 
percent real social discount rate in the case of costs. In the tables that follow, both the net present 
value (NPV) of costs and the total undiscounted amount of policy benefits are shown under the 
row “NPV”.
28 Their ratio is shown as “cost-effectiveness”, a conventional but easily 
misunderstood term because a high number means a less favorable ratio. Note that this ratio can 
be lower than the cost-effectiveness in any single year because the cost measures are discounted 
but the effectiveness measures are not. 
  The annual net costs of each policy are categorized similarly to the analysis by NHTSA 
(2008). The values in some categories are negative, indicating offsetting benefits. Those benefits 
exclude the targets themselves, e.g. oil consumption or GHG emissions. Thus the result is not a 
cost–benefit calculation, but rather is solely the cost side of a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness 
calculation, describing the social cost of achieving the changes in target variables by means of 
                                                 
28NPV is in year 2007, and all costs are in real 2007 dollars. All categories except manufacturing costs (category 1) 
are extrapolated to year 2045 for those vehicles put in place by 2030, based on the assumption that each value would 
decline linearly from its 2030 value over the ensuing 15 years. Results for each year are then discounted to 2007 and 
added. In order to obtain aggregate effectiveness measures, I do the same interpolation and extrapolation of policy 
effects, but they are added without discounting. These discounting decisions were made to conform to other projects 
in the larger study. 
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this policy. I denote each category by –ΔWk if it is a one-time cost for the vehicle and by –Δwk if 
it is an ongoing annual expenditure, where k denotes a particular category of cost or benefit. One 
can think of W or w as denoting “welfare;” thus, –ΔWk or –Δwk is a cost if it is positive, a benefit 
(or cost offset) if negative. The categories are as follows. 
 
(1) Higher Production Cost of Vehicles and Consumer Surplus Loss on Vehicles Not Purchased 
  If consumers pay more for vehicles because of efficiency changes, the lost welfare to 
them is measured approximately by the area of a trapezoid to the left of the demand curve for 
vehicles and between the lines representing their initial and final prices. In the case of a feebate 
policy that is not strictly revenue-neutral, some of this area reflects fees paid (net of rebates 
received); these are not social costs and so are subtracted off, leading to: 
 
   ers) manufactur by    paid   fees net  ( − Δ = Δ − V V P q W    (1) 
 
where q  is the number of vehicles purchased, averaged between the pre- and post-policy 
scenarios, and where ΔPV is the change in vehicle price.
29 
 
(2) Fuel Savings Due to Increased Fuel Efficiency (Negative Cost) 
  In order to include only social values, I multiply fuel savings by the pretax fuel price. The 
resulting offset to policy cost is therefore the following quantity, which is negative: 
 
   [ F P VMT w F F F Δ − ⋅ = Δ − ) ( τ ]
                                                
   (2) 
 
 
29 In practice I am unable through NEMS-RFF to distinguish price changes caused by changes in fuel efficiency 
from those caused by changes in performance. Performance changes seem to be most pronounced in the feebate 
scenarios, which result in considerably greater horsepower even while vehicle weight is also being reduced. I 
therefore make an adjustment to this scenario as follows. I assume that performance changes account for negligible 
cost in the CAFE scenario, and that the welfare measure –ΔWV has the same ratio to fuel efficiency improvements 
for feebates as it does for Pavley CAFE. This assumption seems quite reasonable for the High Feebate scenario 
because it and Pavley CAFE use similar technologies and achieve similar changes in fuel efficiency. It is admittedly 
more tenuous for the Very High Feebate scenario because it implies a linear cost function for fuel efficiency 
improvements. 
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where VMT  is the average of before- and after-policy VMT,  ) ( F F P τ − is the average pretax fuel 
price, and ΔF<0 is the change in fuel intensity of the average vehicle (i.e., the reciprocal of the 
change in the harmonic average of vehicle fuel efficiencies).
30 This estimate of fuel savings may 
be said to be based on a “market failure” interpretation of apparent consumer myopia, because it 
assumes that the full present discounted value of fuel savings is a social benefit whether or not it 
is accounted for by consumers in their purchase decisions. 
 
(3) Loss of Tax Revenues 
  The changes in tax revenue due to changes in fuel efficiency were excluded in (2), so do 
not need to be added back as an offset to costs. However, a change in tax revenues also occurs as 
a result of changes in VMT, and was implicitly included in category (2), so it is subtracted out 
here:  
 
   ) (VMT F w F
V
R Δ ⋅ − = Δ − τ    (3) 
 
where  F F τ  is the average of pre- and post-policy values of tax revenue per vehicle-mile. If (3) is 
negative, representing an increase in revenues due to Δ(VMT)>0, then (3) is interpreted as an 
offset to policy costs.
31 
 
(4) Loss of Consumer Value Due to Shifting from Cars to Trucks (Fuel Tax Scenario Only) 
  Higher fuel prices cause consumers to shift their purchases away from trucks and toward 
cars. The resulting fuel savings are counted in category (2) as a benefit, but we also need to 
account for the value that consumers placed on trucks now foregone. Part of this value may 
                                                 
30 Because it is based on average rather than pre-policy VMT, this value incorporates a small amount representing 
consumer surplus gained or lost because of increased or decreased VMT resulting from fuel efficiency 
improvements. 
31 One can argue that changes in tax revenues should be multiplied by a factor reflecting the marginal cost of public 
funds, which implies that a dollar of tax revenues produces more than one dollar in revenue because it can replace 
other distorting taxes and thus eliminate the “excess burden” of their distortions. A factor commonly used for this 
purpose is 1.15, although the appropriate number can vary widely among nations; see Small and Verhoef (2007, pp. 
177-178) for a discussion and references. Including it would mainly decrease the welfare cost of fuel taxes. 
However, in practice such tax revenues are often used to fund other projects, or are redistributed in such a way as to 
increase political support, so the reduction in “excess burden” may never be realized. 
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represent an “arms race” for safety thus not be a social value; but those safety costs will be 
accounted for separately in category (7), so the full value needs to be included here. This is done 
by imputing the value from the extra private fuel costs that would have been incurred to drive 
those trucks had the shift not occurred: 
 
   F c t t T P VMT F F s w ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ Δ = Δ ) (    (4) 
 
where Δst is the change in truck share due to the policy, and Ft and Fc are the fuel efficiencies of 
trucks and cars, respectively. In practice, this category turns out to be small. 
 
 (5) Hidden Amenity Losses (optional calculation) 
  Aside from inducing shifts in vehicle mix, the fuel-efficiency improvements brought 
about by policies may directly cause a loss of amenities to drivers—for example, by making cars 
less reliable. This is one possible explanation for why drivers appear to consider less than the full 
present discounted value of fuel savings when making purchase decisions. I have developed a 
very approximate measure of the maximum such amenity losses, based on the assumption that 
they account for the full difference between the true discounted value of private fuel savings (as 

















S are the annuity factors giving the present values of a $1 annual income stream 
computed, respectively, at the perceived and social values for discount rate and lifetime.
32 This 
estimate of amenity losses in effect offsets about three-fourths of the fuel cost savings. 
                                                 
]
32 The annuity factor is  . The discount rates incorporate an annual growth rate in fuel price 
of 2 percent, which approximates the 2010-2030 price change in the baseline scenario and is assumed to be 
anticipated by users. Therefore A
P is computed using r=0.17 and T=3 (reflecting NEMS-RFF assumption including 
15 percent private discount rate), whereas A
S is computed at r=0.07 and T=14 (reflecting project assumptions 
including 5 percent social discount rate, and the actual average car lifetime).  
[ r r T r A
T / ) 1 ( 1 ) , (
− + − =
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(6) External Cost of Changed Amount of Driving (optional calculation) 
  This is simply an estimate of the marginal external cost of congestion, local air pollution, 
and accidents, multiplied by the change in VMT: 
 
    .    (6)  ) (VMT c w M E Δ = Δ −
 
This component turns out to be quite important so, for comparability with other studies, I show 
results both with and without it. The key parameter cM begins at a value $0.111/mile in 2010 
(stated in real 2007 dollars) and grows at 1.1 percent per year, based on adjusting estimates in 
Parry and Small (2005) for changes in prices and wage rates. 
 
(7) Accident Costs from Trucks (optional calculation) 
  I also compute an estimate of the additional accident costs incurred by shifts from cars to 
trucks, discussed in Section 3.2. Here I take the estimates of Li (2010), which imply that each 
shift of one million vehicles from cars to trucks adds the equivalent of 20.3 fatalities per year to 
accident costs.
33 Applying a medium estimate of the value of a statistical life of $5.5 million, as 
does Li, gives an accident cost of cS=$112 per year for each car that is replaced by a truck in the 
overall fleet. Thus the safety costs are: 
 
      (7)  t S S S Q c w Δ = Δ
 
where Q is the number of vehicle in use under the policy and  t S Δ  is the policy-induced change 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
33 This is Li’s calculation at an initial truck share of 45 percent, which is close to the average over the years 2010–
2030 in my baseline case. 
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  Table 6 shows selected results of these calculations. Three subtotals of categories are 
calculated. The first (“lower estimate”) includes only categories (1)–(4), thus implicitly assuming 
that the fuel-cost savings achieved by correcting consumer “myopia” are social savings. The 
second (“upper estimate”) adds category (5) for hidden amenity losses, thus assuming instead 
that the original consumer decisions were already socially efficient. The cost-effectiveness 
measures (both for petroleum consumption and for CO2 emissions) are calculated using each of 
these alternate subtotals. In addition, a third subtotal is shown omitting category (5) but adding 
(6) and (7); the difference between this subtotal and the “lower estimate” reflects changes in the 
external costs of congestion, air pollution, and safety. 
 
Table 6.  Policy Costs: Fuel Tax and Feebate Policies     
2020 2030 NPV 2020 2030 NPV 2020 2030 NPV
Costs of policy (billions 2007 $)
1. Extra cost of new, more fuel-efficient vehicles sold 1.1 3.9 11.3 16.7 42.5 156.6 17.8 42.3 159.4
2. –Fuel cost savings from more fuel-efficient vehicles -5.8 -11.7 -74.5 -5.7 -44.0 -185.5 -8.3 -42.7 -193.0
3. Lost tax revenue & consumer value from less driving 6.6 9.2 75.3 0.0 -0.8 -2.8 -0.2 -0.9 -3.8
4. Loss of value from light trucks (fuel tax only) 0.3 0.6 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Total (1–4) (lower estimate) 2.2 1.9 15.6 11.0 -2.3 -31.7 9.3 -1.3 -37.5
Alternative calculations:
5. Hidden amenity cost 5.8 11.8 75.4 4.8 36.1 152.5 6.8 35.1 158.8
    Total w/ hidden amnty cost (1–5) (upper estimate) 8.0 13.7 91.0 15.7 33.8 120.8 16.1 33.8 121.3
6. –External cost savings from of less driving -19.1 -32.8 -235.8 0.3 10.3 35.4 2.0 11.6 47.1
7. –Accident cost savings from shift in car–truck mix -1.3 -1.7 -13.8 0.1 0.6 2.2 0.1 0.8 3.3
   Total with external & accident costs (1–4,6–7)  -18.2 -32.6 -234.0 11.4 8.6 5.9 11.4 11.1 12.9
Policy effectiveness (reduction from baseline)
     Petroleum consumption (milllion barrels) 280 290 5,228 43 263 3,612 47 242 3,454
     Energy-related CO2 (million metric tons) 130 135 2,419 19 101 1,429 20 82 1,211
Cost-effectiveness (based on "lower estimate")
Policy cost per:
    barrel petroleum consumption ($/bbl) 8 7 3 255 -9 -9 198 -5 -11
    metric ton CO2 reduced ($/tonne) 17 14 6 563 -22 -22 473 -16 -31
Cost-effectiveness (based on "upper estimate")
Policy cost per:
    barrel petroleum consumption ($/bbl) 29 47 17 366 129 33 344 140 35
    metric ton CO2 reduced ($/tonne) 62 102 38 808 334 85 820 412 100
High Fuel Tax Pavley CAFE High Feebate
 
Notes: Positive numbers denote a cost of the policy, negative numbers an offsetting benefit other than the policies’ target 
benefits of lower energy consumption and lower GHG emissions. bbl stands for barrels. NPV stands for net present value in 
2007, computed at a 5 percent interest rate and including estimated continuing benefits through 2045. For effectiveness 
measures, it is just the undiscounted total for 2010–2045. Because costs are discounted but effectiveness measures are not, 
overall cost-effectiveness in the “NPV” columns can be lower than the cost-effectiveness in any single year. 
 
   Table 6 shows the results for two selected years and for the aggregate over all years. 
Consider first the fuel tax, shown on the left side of the table. Consistent with the modest gains in 
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technological efficiency it elicits, the costs to manufacturers in this policy are modest. But as we 
have seen, fuel savings are large because the increased efficiency is supplemented by a 
substantial reduction in driving. This pattern causes several notable features. First, there is a 
large loss in tax revenue and consumer surplus from driving (category 3), whose NPV is 
estimated at $75 billion. Under the “market failure” interpretation of myopia, that loss is entirely 
offset by the market value of less fuel used (category 2); whereas under the “hidden amenity” 
interpretation, those fuel savings are just a compensation for the loss in amenities (category 5)—
losses that are made larger by the high fuel prices occurring in this scenario. The end results are 
cost-effectiveness measures that are quite low (favorable) under the “market failure” 
interpretation—$3 per barrel of oil or $6 per metric ton of CO2—but several times higher (less 
favorable) under the “hidden amenity” interpretation. If external costs of driving are counted, 
however, the policy costs are strongly negative under either interpretation: that is, the ancillary 
benefits of reduced external costs outweigh the other costs of the policy.
34  
  Now consider the Pavley CAFE policy. Because it relies so heavily on new-car fuel 
efficiency, the CAFE policy alone produces high costs but few benefits in the early years of the 
simulation. But it produces considerable benefits later on, both in the form of targeted outcomes 
(petroleum consumption, CO2 reduction) and in the form of fuel cost savings that offset much of 
the policy costs. As a result, its cost-effectiveness varies widely over time, even becoming 
negative in 2030 (meaning policy effectiveness comes at negative cost) according to the “lower 
estimate” of policy cost. The NPV of cost is also negative according to the lower estimate. If one 
believes in hidden amenity costs, however, the costs become fairly large, resulting in overall 
cost-effectiveness numbers of $33 per barrel of petroleum and $85 per metric ton of CO2. 
  Finally, consider the feebate policy shown on the right side of Table 6. As expected, the 
pattern of costs is very similar to that of the Pavley CAFE policy, which it was designed to 
mimic. One difference, seen in the detailed model results, is that with feebates, manufacturers 
use somewhat fewer technological means to improve efficiency, selling more hybrids instead. 
This occurs because they pass through the rebates, which are considerable for hybrids, to 
consumers. 
                                                 
34 This is seen by noting that row 6 (change in external cost) is negative and larger in magnitude than the row just 
above it (the upper estimate of other policy costs). 
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  Another difference between the feebate and CAFE policies is surprising and informative. 
Both policies increase driving slightly as a result of the rebound effect. But feebates increase 
driving more than could be accounted for in this way. The reason is that the energy sector part of 
NEMS-RFF predicts a small decrease in fuel prices due to these policies, presumably because 
pressure on world and national resources is relieved. For gasoline, this price decrease in 2030 is 
10 cents per gallon for the Pavley CAFE policy and 12 cents for the High Feebate policy. These 
small changes in price are powerful enough to induce more driving, especially under feebates. 
This makes little difference in the policy costs as calculated at the top of the table, but it affects 
line six (the external cost from increased driving) enough to noticeably raise the total cost per 
unit effectiveness of the feebate policy relative to CAFE when such external costs are included. 
Some of these economy-wide differences may be driven by the interactions of these policies with 
alternative fuel mandates, incentives for diesels and E85, and other factors that affect overall 
demand for different types of fuels.  
 
5.3  Summary Comparison of Policies 
 
  Table 7 presents summary cost and cost-effectiveness estimates for all six policies: two 
fuel tax policies, one CAFE extension, a combined CAFE extension and fuel tax, and two 
feebate policies. The welfare costs shown are the average of the lower and upper policy cost 
estimates described earlier: that is, they assume that half of the discrepancy between perceived 
and objective fuel-cost savings represents a real economic distortion and half is caused by hidden 
amenity losses associated with those cars.  
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Petroleum reduction (million barrels) 5,228 9,614 3,612 12,262 3,454 4,998
CO2 reduction (million metric tons) 2,419 4,590 1,429 5,679 1,211 1,739
Policy cost metrics
Without external costs of driving:
Welfare cost ($ billion) 53.3 206.5 44.6 265.9 41.9 116.8
Cost effectiveness: petroleum ($/barrel) 10.2 21.5 12.3 21.7 12.1 23.4
Cost effectiveness: CO2 ($/metric ton) 22.0 45.0 31.2 46.8 34.6 67.1
With external costs of driving:
Welfare cost ($ billion) -182.5 -212.2 80.0 -126.2 89.0 186.6
Cost effectiveness: petroleum ($/barrel) -34.9 -22.1 22.1 -10.3 25.8 37.3
Cost effectiveness: CO2 ($/metric ton) -75.4 -46.2 55.9 -22.2 73.5 107.3  
Notes: Monetary figures are in 2007 dollars. All policies are relative to the baseline. Welfare costs are discounted at 5 
percent interest (real), and include an estimate of post-2030 costs or cost offsets. Total effects are undiscounted totals, 
also including estimate of post-2030 effects. Welfare costs are the average of the “lower” and “upper” estimates in 
Table 6. Cost effectiveness is defined as cost divided by the particular effect (petroleum reduction or CO2 reduction) 
being considered. 
 
  The table shows that, for each of the pairs of policies, the average cost-effectiveness rises 
substantially as policy stringency is increased. For example, in the “Very High Fuel Tax” 
scenario, manufacturers adopt the most aggressive of the five available material-substitution 
technologies for 23 percent of new cars in 2030, compared to 12 percent with the “High Fuel 
Tax” and just 6 percent under the baseline scenario. Comparing the “High” and “Very High” 
feebate policies, the latter is about 50 percent more effective but costs twice as much or more, 
resulting in notably higher cost-effectiveness numbers. This pattern reflects diminishing returns 
to policies aimed at any particular set of responses. 
  The table also confirms that the fuel tax Pavley CAFE policies are complementary. The 
combined policy achieves the greatest reductions in petroleum use and CO2 emissions of any 
policy simulated, yet its cost-effectiveness (excluding external costs of driving) is barely higher 
than that of the fuel-tax policy alone.  
  The bottom panel of the table highlights how dramatically different the results are if one 
accounts for the external costs of driving, estimated as explained earlier (category 6). These costs 
are so large that even the small increases in VMT resulting from CAFE and feebate policies add 
substantially to their policy costs when external costs are included. Even more dramatically, the 
large reductions in VMT from the scenarios involving higher fuel taxes bring policy benefits 
which, in these calculations, more than offset all the policy costs. These results show that the 
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side effects of these policies are potentially as important as, or more important than, all of the 




  The policies modeled here are as strong as or stronger than any policies that have made 
serious headway in the U.S. political system. Nevertheless, their effects are modest. Stronger 
effects are possible, but at increasing political difficulty and worsening cost-effectiveness. Partly 
this is because even the milder policies come close to exhausting the set of possible 
technological improvements that are currently known to be available at reasonable cost.  
  High fuel taxes have considerable advantages: their effects begin quickly, and they are 
not counteracted by the “rebound effect”. Furthermore, a high fuel tax can be combined 
effectively with a policy mandating new-vehicle fuel efficiency, providing greater effectiveness 
at a unit cost comparable to that of the fuel tax alone. 
  Shifts among size classes of vehicles play a somewhat muted role. Nevertheless, the fuel 
tax policies make part of their gains by luring people out of light trucks and into cars—raising 
car market share by 6 percentage points in 2020 in the case of the High Fuel Tax. CAFE and 
feebate policies work in the opposite direction. 
  Regarding the costs of policies, a number of interesting lessons emerge. Several of these 
are due to inherent properties of the policies and so are likely to generalize beyond the United 
States. 
  First, policy costs for fuel taxes are significant but reasonable, even under pessimistic 
assumptions. For example, the central cost estimate presented here (excluding the savings on 
external costs of driving) is $22 per metric ton of CO2 for the High Fuel Tax. 
  Second, policy costs for CAFE and feebates are also significant and depend strongly on 
why consumers value fuel savings at less than their objective economic value. Fuel-cost savings 
are undeniably large, but most or all of them are offset if the fuel-efficient cars have hidden 
amenity costs. Thus, depending on assumptions, these policies can be very cheap or very 
expensive per barrel of oil or per ton of CO2 saved. 
  Third, under intermediate assumptions, the CAFE and fuel tax policies are 
complementary, achieving much greater effects but with cost-effectiveness only slightly inferior 
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to that of the fuel tax alone. Thus there is a strong case for supplementing CAFE policies with 
some policy to raise the price of fuel. Not only does this counter the rebound effect, it should 
make it easier for manufacturers to sell the more efficient cars mandated under CAFE, and so 
should facilitate implementation and enforcement. 
  Fourth, according to NEMS-RFF’s depiction of the larger energy markets, the policies 
shown in Section 4 will cause a reduction in the pretax gasoline price of $0.08–$0.12 per gallon 
in 2030 (Tables 2–5). The associated cost savings, even within just the transportation sector, 
create substantial benefits for U.S. consumers. Most of these benefits are at the expense of oil-
exporting nations and are not shown in the policy cost calculations presented here, but could be 
considered another of the desired effects of these policies. 
  Finally, the external costs of driving—congestion, accidents, and local air pollution—are 
very important side effects of these policies. Vehicle travel is mildly encouraged by CAFE and 
feebates (the so-called rebound effect), and discouraged by the fuel tax. For this reason, counting 
external costs increases the policy costs of CAFE and feebates but greatly decreases the policy 
costs of fuel taxes. If such external costs were addressed with more direct policies, for example 
congestion pricing of roads, this category of costs would no longer exist and so the welfare 
estimates omitting them would be the appropriate ones; but in such a world several basic 
properties of the base case would be different, which would in turn change somewhat the impacts 
of the energy policies modeled here. 
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